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Article
FOUR CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
THAT THE MINIMUM COVERAGE
PROVISION RESPECTS
Neil S. Siegel*
JUSTICE O’CONNOR: If this is covered, what’s left of enumerated
powers? What is there that Congress could not do, under this rubric, if
you are correct?
GENERAL DAYS: Justice O’Connor, that certainly is a question that
one might ask, but this Court has asked that question in a number of
other circumstances, and rather than starting from the assumption that
something was inherently local, it’s looked at the degree to which
Congress had a reasonable basis for extending its authority under the
commerce power to regulate that particular activity.1

INTRODUCTION
The minimum coverage provision in the Patient Protection
2
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires most people lawfully
living in the United States to obtain a certain level of health
3
insurance coverage or pay a certain amount of money each year.
Constitutional critics of this “individual mandate” fall into two
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke Law School. I thank Jack Balkin,
Stuart Benjamin, Joseph Blocher, Curtis Bradley, Guy Charles, Erwin Chemerinsky, R.
Craig Green, Mark Hall, Orin Kerr, Jedediah Purdy, and Jonathan Wiener for
illuminating suggestions. I am grateful to Daniel Strunk (Trinity College, 2014), Bryan
Leitch (Duke Law, 2012), and, especially, Katie Ertmer (Duke Law, 2013) for outstanding research assistance.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(No. 93-1260), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260/
argument/.
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–
152, 124 Stat. 1029.
3. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2010). The minimum coverage provision goes into
effect on January 1, 2014.
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categories. Some critics make the sweeping assertion that if
Congress can impose a mandate to obtain health insurance
coverage, then Congress can impose any mandate—indeed, any
Commerce Clause regulation—it wants on Americans, so that
there is nothing left of the constitutional principle of a national
government of limited, enumerated powers. Less implausibly,
other critics insist that even if upholding the minimum coverage
provision would not mean Congress could impose any mandate
or other regulation it wants on Americans, Congress could at
least impose whatever “economic” mandates it wants, including
federal requirements to purchase specific kinds and quantities of
food, transportation, housing, and insurance.
Supporters of the ACA tend to defend the minimum
coverage provision by showing that its constitutionality follows
from a correct application of contemporary doctrine concerning
the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or the
4
tax power. These demonstrations are sufficiently persuasive that
a number of prominent conservative jurists or scholars have
deemed decisive at least one doctrinal argument in favor of the
5
minimum coverage provision. The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, can change the governing doctrine.
Accordingly, such demonstrations alone may not suffice to
persuade five Justices to uphold the minimum coverage
provision. For the provision to survive the Court’s likely review
in the wake of its invalidation by the United States Court of
6
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, defenders of the ACA’s
4. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Ideology and Constitutional DecisionMaking: The Coming Example of the Affordable Care Act, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3
(forthcoming 2012); Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform,
159 U. PENN. L. REV. 1825 (2011); Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective
Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3
(forthcoming 2012); Laurence H. Tribe, The limits of intuition, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 4,
2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-limits-of-intuition/.
5. These judges or scholars have concluded that the minimum coverage provision
is within the scope of the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. See,
e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) (majority opinion of
Silberman, J.); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, at 27 (6th Cir. June 29,
2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court in part);
Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. at 4 (Feb. 2, 2011) (statement of Charles Fried, Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02%20Fried%20Testimony.pdf; Orin
Kerr, Some Tentative Thoughts on the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate Under
Current Supreme Court Doctrine, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 6, 2010, 2:25 AM), http://
volokh.com/2010/10/06/some-tentative-thoughts-on-the-constitutionality-of-the-individualmandate-under-current-supreme-court-doctrine/.
6. A grant of certiorari is now likely both because a federal court of appeals has
invalidated an important provision of federal law, and because there is a circuit split on
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constitutionality may need to identify principled, judicially enforceable limits on the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers
7
that the minimum coverage provision respects.
So far, however, the federal government’s briefs shy away
from endorsing specific limits on the Commerce Clause beyond
8
what the Supreme Court itself has identified. If anxiety about
unlimited federal power attracts the attention of five Justices,
they will take a hard look at what the government’s limiting
principles are.
The present situation brings to mind the oral argument in
9
United States v. Lopez. The Justices asked Solicitor General
Drew Days a series of direct questions about the limits of the
Commerce Clause. In response, General Days was unable or
unwilling to identify a single hypothetical regulation that was
10
beyond the scope of the commerce power. Folk lore has it that
an important question of federal law. See U.S. SUP. CT. RULE 10. Compare Seven-Sky v.
Holder, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) (upholding minimum coverage provision as
within the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, No. 10-2388, at 28 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (same), with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen.
v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1282 (11th Cir. 2011) (invalidating
the minimum coverage provision as beyond the scope of Congress’s enumerated
powers).
7. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled for the federal
government on jurisdictional grounds. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347,
2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (holding that the federal tax Anti-Injunction
Act (AIA) bars the action); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058,
2011 WL 3925617 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (holding that Virginia lacks Article III standing
to bring the action). Other courts have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion
that the AIA bars pre-enforcement challenges to the minimum coverage provision. The
Supreme Court’s view of the question will determine whether it reaches the merits.
8. Accord Adam Winkler, Gotcha, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 5, 2011, 9:16 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/gotcha/ (“One searches in vain for a persuasive
answer to the ‘gotcha’ question in the briefs filed by the government in the ACA cases
winding their way through the federal courts. They all argue that the mandate is well
within Congress’s power, while offering few clues as to what are the practical and
theoretical limits to that power.”).
9. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
10. See Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Lopez, supra note 1 and
accompanying text. For strike two, see id. at 4–5:
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Well, what would be—if this case is—
Congress can reach under the interstate commerce power, what would be an
example of a case which you couldn’t reach?
GENERAL DAYS: Well, Your Honor, I’m not prepared to speculate
generally, but this Court has found that Congress, for example, . . . could not
require New York State to carry out certain responsibilities, because it was
commandeering the instrumentalities of the State.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, the objection there was that it was objecting the
State governmental machinery to operate in a certain way. The question here, it
seems to me, is quite different. The question here is the universe of transactions
that the Congress may reach.
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his nonresponsive answers contributed to the federal govern11
ment’s 5-4 loss. Whether or not that is true, his exchanges with
12
the Court could not have helped the government’s case.
In this essay, I identify four principled and judicially
enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause that
counsel upholding the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision in the ACA. Under the restrictions imposed by
these limits, Congress may not use its commerce power: (1) to
regulate noneconomic subject matter; (2) to impose a regulation
that violates constitutional rights, including the right to bodily
integrity; (3) to regulate at all, including by imposing a mandate,
unless it reasonably believes that the regulation will ameliorate a
significant collective action problem involving multiple states; or
(4) to impose an economic mandate unless it reasonably believes
that other regulatory means would be less effective or more
coercive.
The first two limits are firmly established in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. The third limit has been
developed by an increasing number of scholars whose work
understands the Commerce Clause in light of the collective
action problems that the nation faced under the Articles of
Confederation, when Congress lacked the power to regulate

GENERAL DAYS: Yes.
11. For strike three, see id. at 20:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: What are the limits, then? You said . . . all of violent
crime could come within it. You’re not making the distinction between
concurrent jurisdiction and displacing the State authority, so what is the check?
How would you describe the check that the Court has?
GENERAL DAYS: Well, I’m perhaps left to repeat myself in some respects.
This Court has never said that there are absolute limits to the exercise of the
commerce power. It’s looked at individual cases and tried to determine,
exercising—
JUSTICE GINSBURG: What would be a case that would fall outside, other
than the one that you—the nuclear waste, telling the State, in effect, you serve
as Federal official for this purpose?
GENERAL DAYS: I don’t have—
JUSTICE SCALIA: Don’t give away anything here. (Laughter.) They might
want to do it next—. . . .
GENERAL DAYS: —the Court has never looked at this in the abstract. It’s
not an abstract process. It’s been viewed by the Court as an empirical process.
12. To be sure, the Solicitor General (SG) is not well positioned institutionally to
identify for the Court constitutional limits on the powers of the federal government, the
SG’s client. But it is in the best interests of the client for the SG to do so when it likely
means the difference between winning and losing a momentous case before a Court that
insists on such limits.
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interstate commerce. The fourth limit—a restrained inquiry
into the coerciveness and efficacy of the regulatory alternatives
available to Congress—I articulate here. Although I do not
endorse such a limit, its imposition would have a sounder
constitutional basis than the interpretive mistake of invalidating
the minimum coverage provision on the broad ground that
Congress may never regulate “inactivity” using its commerce
power, either alone or in combination with the Necessary and
14
Proper Clause. From McCulloch v. Maryland to United States v.
15
Comstock, the Court has understood Congress to possess ample
means to pursue its constitutionally enumerated ends.
Therefore, any concerns about the coerciveness of regulating
“inactivity” should be balanced against the relative efficacy and
coerciveness of regulating through other means.
If the proffered distinction between inactivity and activity
resonates with the Court, then the outcome of the ACA
litigation may turn on whether approving the minimum coverage
provision means approving any mandate that Congress might
theoretically impose (no matter how politically unlikely). The
minimum coverage provision is constitutionally distinguishable
from many other potential mandates for at least four reasons.
First, the subject matter regulated by the provision is economic
in nature. Second, the provision violates no constitutional rights.
Third, Congress reasonably concluded that the provision would
help to solve a significant problem of collective action among the
states caused by cost shifting and adverse selection in the health
care and insurance markets. Fourth, Congress reasonably concluded that no alternative to the minimum coverage provision
would be as effective and less coercive.
Part I identifies why the minimum coverage provision
regulates economic subject matter. Part II discusses why the
provision does not violate constitutional rights. Part III explains
why the provision is unlikely to be saved by the invocation of
political limits on the power of Congress to impose mandates.
Part IV clarifies why Congress had a reasonable basis to
conclude that the minimum coverage provision would
ameliorate a significant problem of collective action among the
states. Part V addresses why Congress had a reasonable basis to

13. For a discussion, see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
14. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
15. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
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conclude that regulatory alternatives to the provision would be
less effective or more coercive.
Part VI uses these four limits on the scope of the Commerce
Clause to illuminate the constitutional pertinence of five
characteristics of the interstate health care market that
economists have identified as distinguishing it from other
markets: the inevitability of access, the unpredictability of
access, the potentially enormous cost of care, the legal
entitlement to care in an emergency, and the substantial cost
shifting and adverse selection problems that disrespect state
borders. The Conclusion summarizes the four judicially
enforceable limits on Congress’s commerce power that are either
presently in place or potentially available, all of which will be
maintained if the Court upholds the minimum coverage
provision in the ACA.
I. LIMIT #1: NO NONECONOMIC MANDATES
The most aggressive critics of the ACA insist that if
Congress can require people to obtain health insurance coverage
or pay a certain amount of money each year, then Congress can
impose on individuals whatever requirements it wants by
16
invoking its commerce power. They further insist that if
16. See, e.g., Editorial, ObamaCare and the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2010,
at A16 (“If the insurance mandate stands, then why can’t Congress insist that Americans
buy GM cars, or that obese Americans eat their vegetables or pay a fat tax penalty?”); Is
President Obama’s Individual Health Care Mandate Constitutional?, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, http://www.askheritage.org/is-president-obamas-individual-health-caremandate-constitutional/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (“If Congress can impose a healthinsurance mandate, then there is no limit to what Congress can do, and the Constitution’s
limits on congressional power will have essentially been eliminated.”); Lloyd
Dunkelberger, Health Care Fight Opens in Florida, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Sept.
14, 2010, at A01 (“If Congress can regulate the failure to have health care insurance
coverage, it can equally regulate the ‘failure’ to meet any other requirement it chooses to
impose.”); Warren Richey, Attorneys General in 11 States Poised to Challenge Healthcare
Bill, CSMONITOR.COM, (Mar. 22, 2010) (quoting Virginia Attorney General Ken
Cuccinelli as arguing that “[j]ust being alive is not interstate commerce . . . [i]f it were,
there would be no limit to the U.S. Constitution’s commerce clause [sic] and to
Congress’s authority to regulate everything we do”); Lauren Seifert, Ken Cuccinelli:
Health Care Mandate Like Forcing People to Buy Guns, CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 14, 2010,
1:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20025622-503544.html (“Never before in our history has the federal government ordered Americans to buy a product
under the guise of regulating commerce. . . . Imagine if this bill were that in order to
protect our communities and homeland security, every American had to buy a gun. Can
you image the reaction across the country to that?”).
The title of an opinion editorial by Randy Barnett falls in the sweeping category, but
he likely did not choose the title. See Randy Barnett, If Obamacare’s Mandate Is Approved,
Congress Can Require Anything, THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER (June 6, 2011, 8:05 PM),
http:// washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/2011/06/if-obamacares-mandate-approved-
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Congress can regulate whatever it wants by invoking its commerce power, then there is nothing left of judicial enforcement
of constitutional limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.
The conclusion follows from the premise, but the premise is
incorrect. The decision whether or not to purchase health
insurance is an economic decision. Because the need for nearly
all people to access health care services is unavoidable,
unpredictable, and legally guaranteed in medical emergencies,
and because the cost of such access is potentially crushing even
17
for wealthy individuals who lack insurance, the decision
whether or not to obtain health insurance coverage is a decision
about how to manage substantial financial risk. Financially able
individuals who decline to purchase health insurance are making
the economic decision to “go bare” with respect to the risk of
serious injury or illness.
In insurance law, the phrase “going bare” is used to describe
the conduct of a business enterprise that chooses to be
uninsured, or severely underinsured, regarding a risk. Such an
enterprise is making the economic decision to self-insure, relying
either on personal resources or on the protections afforded by
18
federal bankruptcy law in the event the risk materializes.
Businesses that persist in going bare are sometimes described as
engaging in conduct that entails potentially high economic risk
19
to themselves and others. If bankruptcy results, substantial
costs associated with this financial risk will be shifted to
20
creditors.

congress-can-require-anything. The piece itself focuses on economic mandates and argues
for a categorical principle that the commerce power does not authorize Congress to
require people to contract with private companies. Id. By contrast, Ilya Somin charges
without qualification that “there is no way to uphold the mandate without giving
Congress unlimited power to mandate anything.” Ilya Somin, Insurance Mandate Has
Fatal Flaws, NEWSDAY (Aug. 16, 2011, 7:24 PM), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/
oped/somin-insurance-mandate-has-fatal-flaws-1.3101602.
17. For a discussion of the constitutional relevance of these and other
characteristics of the interstate health care market, see infra Part VI.
18. Rosie Cisneros, Malpractice Insurance Costs and Going Bare, LODMELL &
LODMELL, http://www.lodmell.com/malpractice-insurance-cost-going-bare (“Malpractice
costs have become so expensive that more and more physicians are seeking alternatives
wherever they can find them. Some are so angry and frustrated by soaring insurance
premiums that they are going ‘bare,’ foregoing costly insurance—relying instead, in some
cases, on the threat of bankruptcy to bail them out of any hefty patient claims. This is a
risky choice, indeed.”).
19. Id. (“Going ‘bare,’ especially when it comes to medical malpractice insurance,
has never seemed advisable.”).
20. I thank my colleague Jonathan Wiener for alerting me to the business practice
of “going bare” with respect to a risk.
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The economic nature of the decision whether or not to
purchase health insurance means that upholding the minimum
coverage provision would not require revisiting the requirement
of United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison, and
Gonzales v. Raich that Congress may regulate only “economic”
or “commercial” subject matter when using its commerce power
in cases involving allegedly substantial effects on interstate
21
commerce. Accordingly, upholding the minimum coverage
provision would not authorize Congress to impose mandates that
22
regulate noneconomic subject matter. The Court articulated the
distinction between economic and noneconomic subject matter
in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich in order to give Congress the
authority to regulate markets, but not to regulate merely social
23
forms of interaction.
A mandate is noneconomic, as opposed to economic, when
Congress is attempting to regulate something other than a
market through the mandate. For example, if the Court were to
uphold the minimum coverage provision, it would remain
beyond the scope of the commerce power for Congress to
require individuals to possess firearms in their homes (or in
school zones) on the ground that such possession, in the
24
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. It would
21. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (stressing the economic/
noneconomic distinction); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (same); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same).
22. Under Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, the “economic” or “noneconomic” characterization attaches to the object of congressional regulation, not to the regulation itself.
23. Accord Orin Kerr, The “Unlimited Power” Argument and the Commerce
Clause, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 17, 2011, 1:02 PM), http://volokh.com/
2011/08/17/the-unlimited-power-argument-and-the-commerce-clause/ (“[A]rguments in
support of the mandate do reflect a limitation on the scope of federal power: the line
between regulating markets in goods and services and regulating outside of markets in
goods and services. . . . But while the economic/non-economic line may not be enough of
a limitation to me, I don’t think it’s accurate to say that it makes the federal government
one of unlimited power.”).
24. Some critics of the minimum coverage provision include a mandate to purchase
firearms in their parade of horribles if the minimum coverage provision is upheld. See,
e.g., Seifert, supra note 16 (quoting Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli’s
statement that “[n]ever before in our history has the federal government ordered
Americans to buy a product under the guise of regulating commerce,” and that
“[i]magine if this bill were that . . . every American had to buy a gun”). This hypothetical
is not as far-fetched as it may seem. One city in the United States has a law requiring its
residents to keep a firearm in the home. See Anna Fifield, Kennesaw, Where Everyone Is
Armed By Law, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 25, 2010, 9:32 AM), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/2/5c1b6a72-c5eb-11df-b53e-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Vao6SUEn (“But this city,
half an hour’s drive north of Atlanta, is unique: it is the only place in America where it is
compulsory to own a gun. In 1982, Kennesaw City Council unanimously passed an
ordinance requiring households to own at least one firearm with ammunition.”); cf.
Glenn Reynolds, Op-Ed., A Rifle in Every Pot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2007), http://
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remain beyond the scope of the commerce power for Congress
to provide victims of gender-motivated violence with a private
civil damages remedy against individuals who do not render
assistance when they witness acts of gender-motivated violence
25
being perpetrated in their midst. In both instances, as in Lopez
and Morrison but unlike in Raich, Congress would not be
attempting to regulate an actual or shadow market.
II. LIMIT #2: NO MANDATES THAT VIOLATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Upholding the minimum coverage provision would not
mean that Congress could impose mandates that violate
constitutional rights. Some of the hypotheticals that have been
floated include requiring Americans to eat broccoli or exercise a
26
certain number of hours per week. These hypotheticals
implicate the constitutional right to bodily integrity, for “[t]he
integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our
27
society.” This right is protected against interference by both the
federal government and the states under the Due Process
28
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Infringements of the right to bodily integrity must meet
29
heightened scrutiny. This would be difficult for any government
www.nytimes.com/2007/01/16/opinion/16reynolds.html (“Last month, Greenleaf, Idaho,
adopted Ordinance 208, calling for its citizens to own guns and keep them ready in their
homes in case of emergency. . . . Greenleaf is following in the footsteps of Kennesaw,
Ga., which in 1982 passed a mandatory gun ownership law in response to a handgun ban
passed in Morton Grove, Ill.”).
25. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10cv-91-RV/EMT at 46 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (“Congress could require that people buy
and consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required purchases will
positively impact interstate commerce, but also because people who eat healthier tend to
be healthier, and are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the health care
system.”).
27. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
28. For a discussion of the right to bodily integrity, see Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri
Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring). “As the Court
notes,” Justice O’Connor observed, “the liberty interest in refusing medical treatment
flows from decisions involving the State’s invasions into the body. Because our notions of
liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and selfdetermination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to
the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 287 (citation omitted). Some of
the Court’s most important bodily integrity decisions arose in the criminal procedure
context. See id. at 287–88 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952),
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, and Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985)).
29. I am not aware of Supreme Court decisions that have specifically declared the
level of scrutiny triggered by infringements of the right to bodily integrity. It is clear,
however, that the Court was applying more than rational basis review in the decisions
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in America to do. If, say, there were an epidemic spreading
around the nation that could be cured or prevented only by
eating broccoli, then it likely would not violate the right for
Congress to require people to eat broccoli—just as it likely
would not violate the right for Congress to require people to get
vaccinated in such circumstances. But given the state of the
world in which Americans have long lived (that is, a world in
which one’s life does not depend on eating broccoli), any
attempt by Congress to force people to eat broccoli would
violate the right.
The minimum coverage provision does not implicate the
right to bodily integrity. No one argues otherwise. Congress has
required most lawful residents of the United States to obtain
30
health insurance coverage or pay a certain amount of money.
Congress has not required them even to use their coverage, let
alone to ingest anything or engage in a certain level of physical
activity. Although it might seem unnecessary to mention the
distinction between constitutional powers and constitutional
rights, this distinction warrants inclusion in a catalogue of
constitutional limits because much criticism of the minimum
coverage provision ignores it.
Nor does the minimum coverage provision violate
substantive due process, notwithstanding the emphases of
opponents of the ACA on themes of constitutional liberty,
31
freedom from coercion, and individual rights. The Supreme
cited in the previous note.
30. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2010). The minimum coverage provision applies to
U.S. citizens and legal residents. It does not apply to “individuals not lawfully present,”
such as undocumented aliens, to people in prison, or to people with certain religious
objections. Id. The exaction for noncompliance with the provision is inapplicable to
people who need not file a federal income tax return because their household incomes
are too low, to people whose premium payments would be greater than eight percent of
their annual household income, to individuals who are uninsured for short periods of
time, to members of Native American tribes, and to people who show that compliance
with the requirement would impose a hardship. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e) (West 2010). In
2014, the annual exaction for noncompliance will be the greater of $95 or one percent of
income. By 2016, the annual exaction will be the greater of $695 or 2.5 percent of income.
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c) (West 2010). These provisions require no change in behavior for
many people in addition to those listed above, such as those who qualify for Medicaid
and those who already have insurance coverage through their employers.
31. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va.
2010) (“At its core, this dispute is not simply about regulating the business of insurance—
or crafting a scheme of universal health insurance coverage—it’s about an individual’s
right to choose to participate.” (emphasis added)). For an analysis of many instances of
“rights talk” by citizens, politicians, and judges, see generally Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law
Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, and the Fight Over Health Care, 27 J.L.
& POL. (forthcoming Fall 2011).
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Court long ago abandoned freedom from contract as an
32
Accordingly,
independent limit on government power.
Lochner-style substantive due process challenges to the
minimum coverage provision have not survived motions to
33
dismiss.
To summarize the analysis so far, upholding the minimum
coverage provision would not authorize Congress to regulate
noneconomic subject matter using its commerce power, whether
through a mandate or some other regulatory means. Nor would
upholding the minimum coverage provision allow Congress to
impose mandates that violate constitutional rights. Criticism of
the minimum coverage provision to the contrary is best viewed
as hyperbolic political rhetoric.
III. AN ASIDE: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
Are there any additional constitutional limits on the power
of Congress to impose mandates? One possible response to this
question, which is preferred by many defenders of robust federal
commerce power, is that Congress may use the Commerce
Clause to impose any rights-respecting economic mandate as
long as Congress rationally could conclude that the object of
congressional regulation has substantial effects on interstate
34
commerce in the aggregate. Indeed, many nationalists would go
further by rejecting Lopez and Morrison, arguing that Congress
can impose noneconomic mandates as long as Congress
rationally could conclude that the object of congressional
regulation substantially affects interstate commerce in the
aggregate.
Nationalists have a response to “slippery slope” concerns
about the numerosity and invasiveness of future economic
mandates that Congress would be authorized to impose absent
35
further judicial safeguards. In light of the widespread political
32. Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“What is this freedom of contract? The
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”). See Richard A. Primus, Canon,
Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998) (“Lochner is never cited
for its legal authority. Although it has never been formally overruled, it is well
understood among constitutional lawyers that relying on Lochner would be a pointless, if
not a self-destructive, endeavor.”).
33. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716
F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1161–62 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
34. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4.
35. See Ilya Somin, A Mandate for Mandates: Is the Individual Health Insurance
Case a Slippery Slope?, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3 (forthcoming 2012).
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36

unpopularity of individual mandates in the United States,
nationalists can plausibly insist that the political safeguards of
37
federalism will operate to discipline Congress. This observation
about public perceptions of federal regulation, rather than the
Eleventh Circuit’s suggestion about Congress’s past confessions
38
of unconstitutionality, likely explains why Congress has not
made a habit of imposing purchase mandates throughout
American history. Congress seems as likely to impose future
purchase mandates as it is to have imposed them in the past. It
seems as likely to impose them as it is to set the federal
minimum wage at $100 or $1000 per hour. The Court has long
upheld federal minimum-wage laws notwithstanding this
39
theoretical possibility.
The minimum coverage provision, however, is unlikely to be
saved by even a powerful case that the political safeguards of
federalism will limit federal imposition of economic mandates.
Justices who believe in the judicial safeguards of federalism must
be persuaded that upholding the minimum coverage provision
would not mean abandoning those safeguards. Specifically,
whether or not Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan will be reassured by the invocation of political safeguards,
none of the five remaining Justices are likely to view them as

36. According to a recent Associated Press-National Constitution Center poll, 82
percent of respondents answered “no” to the question of whether “the Federal Government should have the power to require all Americans to buy health insurance, and to pay
a fine if they don’t.” AP-Constitution Center Poll, (August 2011), available at http://
surveys.ap.org/data/GfK/AP-GfK%20Poll%20Aug%202011%20FINAL%20Topline_
NCC_1st%20story.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). This datum is striking, even if the
phrasing of the question leaves much to be desired. The ACA does not require all
Americans to buy health insurance, and calling the exaction for going without insurance
a “fine” is provocative and controversial. It is materially equivalent to a tax. See Robert
D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Taxes, Penalties, and the Minimum Coverage Provision
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
37. There is a longstanding debate over the political safeguards of federalism in
U.S. constitutional law. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS 171–259 (1980); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The
Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341; Herbert Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
38. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1289 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The fact that Congress has never before exercised this supposed
authority is telling. As the Supreme Court has noted, ‘the utter lack of statutes imposing
obligations on the States’ executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to
Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such power.’” (citation omitted)).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (sustaining federal
minimum-wage and maximum-hour regulations on manufacturers of goods shipped in
interstate commerce).
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sufficient. If Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito prove unwilling to sign off on federal power
to impose any and all economic mandates (that, of course,
respect individual rights), then the question becomes whether
other judicially enforceable limits are available.
IV. LIMIT #3: NO MANDATES ABSENT COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS
40

As a matter of professional “logic” and “reason,” would
upholding the ACA mandate allow Congress to impose
whatever mandates it wishes, as long as the mandate is economic
and Congress does not violate individual rights? A key question
presented by this litigation is whether there is a principled
distinction between the minimum coverage provision and other
rights-respecting economic mandates that Congress might, at
least as a theoretical matter, impose using its commerce power.
An increasing number of constitutional scholars have
argued that the commerce power should be interpreted in light
of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the
Articles of Confederation, when Congress lacked the power to
41
regulate interstate commerce. During the Critical Period of the
1780s, the states acted individually when they needed to act
collectively, discriminating against interstate commerce and free
riding on the contributions of other states to the federal treasury
and United States military. When states engaged in conduct that
spilled over from one state to another, James Madison, James
Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, and other nationalist Framers
registered that the actions of individually rational states were
42
producing irrational results for the nation. This is a collective
action problem. Empowering Congress to regulate commerce

40. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2582 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he soul of the law . . . is logic and reason.”).
41. See Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE (forthcoming 2011); Siegel, supra note 4; Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel,
Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV.
115 (2010); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010); Andrew
Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 9 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/
koppelman.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2011); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 554 (1995); Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than
One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1934).
42. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 41, at 121–24.
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“among the several States” was and remains a pivotal part of the
solution.
The states often cannot achieve an end when doing so
requires multiple states to cooperate. The commerce power
authorizes Congress to solve economic problems of collective
action that predictably frustrate the states. Such problems are
“among the several States.” Conversely, governmental activities
that do not pose collective action problems for the states are
internal to a state or local. They are beyond the scope of federal
power. All ordinary crime falls in the latter category regardless
of whether the victim of the crime is a commercial enterprise,
43
unless the crime involves multistate organizations or crosses
44
state lines.
The distinction between individual and collective action by
states gives independent, sensible meaning to the phrase “among
the several States” in the Commerce Clause. This phrase
references a problem of collective action involving two or more
states. This is the key inquiry in determining whether
“Commerce,” understood by the Court in terms of its
economic/noneconomic categorization, is interstate and thus
regulable under Clause 3, or is intrastate and thus beyond the
scope of the commerce power.
The distinction between activities that pose collective action
problems for the states and those that do not best explains why
Congress may not usually use its commerce power to regulate
such crimes as assault or gun possession in schools, but may
regulate an interstate market for guns, wheat, or drugs. That is, a
43. Cf. Balkin, supra note 41, at 30 (reading the phrase “among the several states”
in the Commerce Clause so that “Congress can regulate interactions that extend in their
operation beyond the bounds of a particular state”).
44. For example, the federal arson law, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006), appears problematic as commerce power legislation even as applied to commercial enterprises. A federal
ban on arson of buildings actively employed for commercial purposes does not appear to
address any collective action problem involving multiple states:
[S]tate control over arson laws—whether they are applied to arson of a
commercial enterprise or of a private residence—does not seem to cause a
collective action problem. Different rates of arson in different states may have
some effect on the price residents pay for mortgages, insurance, or gas. These
effects, however, do not allow one state to externalize its costs to another. In
controlling arson, one state does not have an incentive to free ride on the laws
of a neighboring state. Nor does one state try to extract concessions from
another state by threatening to reduce sanctions against arsonists. The federal
law apparently did not address a collective action problem, so construing it
narrowly (or invalidating it) [appropriately] limits federal power. . . .
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 41, at 175–76 (analyzing the Court’s use of constitutional
avoidance in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000)).
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collective action perspective offers a way to distinguish the
“truly national” from the “truly local” in Commerce Clause
45
litigation, justifying the outcomes in such cases as Wickard v.
46
47
48
Filburn, United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison,
49
and Gonzales v. Raich.
According to a collective action approach to the Commerce
Clause that reflects the Court’s typical level of scrutiny in
federalism cases, Congress may invoke its commerce power if
there is a reasonable basis to believe that it is ameliorating a
significant problem of collective action involving “more States
50
than one.” If there is no reasonable basis to believe that
Congress is addressing such a collective action problem, then
51
Congress may not invoke its commerce power.
A collective action requirement in commerce power cases
would counsel upholding the minimum coverage provision. As I
52
have argued elsewhere, the provision aims to solve a collective
action problem involving multiple states because it addresses
two free rider problems that spill over state boundaries. The first
free rider problem arises because a financially able individual
who declines to purchase health insurance free rides on
53
benevolence. Pursuant to federal and state law, as well as the
longstanding charitable practices of most hospitals in the United
54
States, others will pay a significant share of the cost of medical
45. For a discussion, see id. at 159–66.
46. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
47. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
48. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
49. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824).
51. Reasonableness is the appropriate test. To ask more of Congress is to impose
heightened scrutiny in Commerce Clause cases, which is unheard of in the Court’s
contemporary federalism jurisprudence. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No.
10-2388, at 49 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the
opinion of the court in part) (“The courts do not apply strict scrutiny to commerce clause
[sic] legislation and require only an ‘appropriate’ or ‘reasonable’ ‘fit’ between means and
ends.” (quoting United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–57 (2010))).
52. See generally Siegel, supra note 4.
53. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (“EMTALA”); Brief for Appellant, at *42, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2011), 2011 WL 686279 (discussing
state tort law creating liability for failure to provide emergency care).
54. See, e.g., CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF
AMERICA’S HOSPITAL SYSTEM 347 (1995) (observing that “the hospital never assumed
the guise of rational and rationalized economic actor during the first three-quarters of
the twentieth century”; that it “continued into the twentieth century, as it had begun in
the eighteenth, to be clothed with public interest in a way that challenged categorical
distinctions between public and private”; and that “[p]rivate hospitals had always been
assumed to serve the community at large—treating the needy.”); id. at 352 (seeing “little
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55

treatment rather than let an uninsured person go untreated.
Moreover, even when the uninsured individual does not receive
medical care for the time being, he or she benefits from the
existence of the health care infrastructure and can rely on its
availability in case of emergency. The minimum coverage
provision is designed to overcome risk taking in reliance on
benevolence.
In addition, theoretical rationales and empirical evidence
suggest that the free rider problem of uncompensated care is
interstate in scope. It is interstate in scope primarily because of
the operation of many insurance companies in multiple states,
the phenomenon of cross-state hospital use, and the interstate
migration (or immobility) of insurance companies, providers,
and individuals in partial response to the existence of different
56
state health care regimes. Perhaps Massachusetts can manage
the federalism problem created by the existence of sister states,
at least once Medicare and Medicaid solve the worst of this
problem. Massachusetts had a low population of uninsured
residents, a health economy, and ample financial resources at the
time it acted. But almost every other state is differently
57
situated.
Strikingly, Massachusetts is the only state that has passed
health care reform legislation that shares the basic ends and
means of the ACA. (Consider, by contrast, the more than forty
states that had enacted laws banning guns in schools when
58
Congress passed the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. ) The
reason is probably not lack of support for the ACA everywhere
except Massachusetts. The President campaigned on the issue of
health care reform, and the nation is divided evenly over the law,
“with 46% saying it was a good thing and 44% saying it was a
59
bad thing.” In all likelihood, part of the reason for the current
prospect of hospitals in general becoming monolithic cost minimizers and profit
maximizers,” and predicting that American society “will feel uncomfortable with a
medical system that does not provide a plausible (if not exactly equal) level of care to the
poor and socially isolated”).
55. Of course, not all participants in the interstate health care market are fairly
described as benevolent. They may merely be complying with the law. The benevolence
is embodied in federal and state laws and charitable social practices.
56. See generally Siegel, supra note 4.
57. See Sara Rosenbaum, Can States Pick Up the Health Reform Torch?, THE NEW
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (Feb. 25, 2010), http://healthpolicyandreform.
nejm.org/ ?p=3088 (“Massachusetts must be understood as the rarity rather than the
norm.”).
58. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. See Frank Newport, One Year Later, Americans Split on Healthcare Law,
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situation at the state level is that the federalism problems
associated with state-by-state solutions are significant—and are
60
perceived by state legislators to be significant.
The minimum coverage provision addresses another kind of
free rider problem: adverse selection in insurance markets. This
adverse selection problem occurs when individuals with higher
expected health care costs are more likely to purchase insurance
than individuals with lower expected health care costs. Absent a
requirement to obtain health insurance coverage, the ACA
exacerbates this problem. This is because the law prohibits
insurance companies from denying coverage based on
preexisting conditions, canceling insurance absent fraud,
charging higher premiums based on medical history, and
61
imposing lifetime limits on benefits. Such prohibitions on
underwriting permit healthy individuals without insurance to
free ride on healthy people with insurance by entering the
market only when they expect to require expensive medical care.
Insurance companies may not be financially viable if the law
denies them the capacity to control costs in the ways noted
above without broadening the risk pool to include healthier
62
people and preventing market timing behavior. As Congress
found, “if there were no [coverage] requirement, many
individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they
63
needed care.” The predicted consequence of the adverse
GALLUP.COM (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146729/One-Year-LaterAmericans-Split-Healthcare-Law.aspx. Although the minimum coverage provision
remains unpopular, see supra note 36, the ACA provisions that prohibit underwriting are
popular, see, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 41, at 14–15. This suggests that many
Americans may not grasp the relationship between the two parts of the law.
60. See id. at 17–18 (arguing that the factual uncertainty about the existence and
scope of a race to the bottom is part of the collective action problem).
61. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (West 2010).
62. See, e.g., Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party, at *3, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-1057 & 111058 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2011) 2011 WL 795219 (“Without an individual mandate
requirement, more individuals will make the rational economic decision to wait to
purchase coverage until they expect to need health care services. If imposed without an
individual mandate provision, the market reform provisions would reinforce this ‘waitand-see’ approach by allowing individuals to move in and out of the market as they
expect to need coverage, undermining the very purpose of insurance to pool and spread
risk.” (footnote omitted)).
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2010). Congress further found that “[b]y
significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the
other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance
premiums,” and that “[t]he requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance
markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do
not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.” Id. See 42 U.S.C.A.
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selection problem absent the minimum coverage provision is a
64
substantial rise in insurance rates.
The connection between the minimum coverage provision
and the (concededly constitutional) ACA provisions that
prohibit underwriting offers a strong constitutional rationale for
65
the minimum coverage provision. This connection justifies the
minimum coverage provision under the interpretation of the
66
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland and
67
United States v. Comstock. This connection also justifies the
provision under the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in
68
69
United States v. Lopez and Gonzales v. Raich.
While there often will be disagreements about the existence,
scope, and significance of collective action problems, as well as
the adequacy of Congress’s response, collective action reasoning
is easier to employ with respect to some problems than others.
For example, in light of the aforementioned free rider problems
that impede the functioning of the health insurance and health
care markets, it is easier to justify the minimum coverage
provision on collective action grounds than it would be to justify
a federal mandate to buy a General Motors car, a house,
broccoli, or a health club membership.
§ 18091(a)(2)(J) (West 2010) (“The requirement is essential to creating effective health
insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated
administrative costs.”).
64. See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Eliminating the Individual
Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance 2 (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Eliminate_Individual_Mandate_06_16.pdf (predicting a 15 to 20
percent increase in premiums for new nongroup policies relative to current law absent a
minimum coverage provision); Bradley Herring, An Economic Perspective on the
Individual Mandate’s Severability from the ACA, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF
MEDICINE (Mar. 10, 2011), http:// www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMpv1101519 (noting the estimation of MIT economist Jonathan Gruber that only eight million people
(instead of 32 million) would join the ranks of the insured if the ACA had no minimum
coverage provision).
65. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that Congress may invoke the
Commerce Clause to regulate insurance markets. See United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944) (“Perhaps no modern commercial
enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as does the insurance
business.”); id. at 541 (“This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial
compartments which function in isolation from each other. Interrelationship,
interdependence, and integration of activities in all states in which they operate are
practical aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business.”); see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(3) (West 2010) (citing South-Eastern Underwriters Association as
authority for the proposition that “insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal
regulation”).
66. 17 U.S. 316, 405–07, 421 (1819).
67. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–58 (2010).
68. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
69. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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In order to impose a mandate to purchase (not to eat)
broccoli, the mandate would have to be designed to regulate
(most likely, to stabilize) agricultural markets, and Congress
would have to reasonably conclude that such a mandate would
help to solve a collective action problem among the states with
respect to those markets. It would not suffice that “the required
purchases will positively impact interstate commerce,” or that
“people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus
more productive and put less of a strain on the health care
70
system.” If a collective action requirement were imposed in
commerce power cases generally, it would limit the authority of
Congress to enact economic mandates specifically.
To be clear, the Court did not say it was imposing a collective action limit in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. As argued
above, however, a collective action framework provides the best
way of understanding—and justifying—what the Court did in
those cases. Moreover, language in the majority and concurring
opinions in Lopez and Raich appears to be animated by
71
For example, Chief Justice
collective action concerns.
Rehnquist wrote in Lopez that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
“is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
72
the intrastate activity were regulated.” This statement suggests
that the absence of regulation of guns near schools in one state
would not undercut the effectiveness of regulations prohibiting
them in other states. Justice Kennedy similarly wrote that if a
state or local government “determines that harsh criminal
sanctions are necessary and wise to deter students from carrying
guns on school premises, the reserved powers of the States are
sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed, over 40 States already
have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or
73
near school grounds.”

70. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91RV/EMT at 46 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
71. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 (“[O]ne concern prompting inclusion of wheat
grown for home consumption in [Wickard] was that rising market prices could draw such
wheat into the interstate market, resulting in lower market prices. The parallel concern
making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is
the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana
into that market.” (citation omitted)).
72. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
73. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Regan, supra note
41, at 566 (attributing a collective action rationale to the part of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion quoted in the text).
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V. LIMIT #4: NO MANDATES IF ALTERNATIVES ARE
AS EFFECTIVE AND LESS COERCIVE
I would stop here. From the perspective of constitutional
federalism, there is nothing distinctive about economic
mandates, as opposed to other concededly constitutional forms
of federal regulation that require regulated individuals to comply
by engaging in certain conduct. It seems to me constitutional for
Congress to impose a rights-respecting economic mandate when
it has a reasonable basis to conclude that such a mandate would
meaningfully address a significant problem of collective action
among the states—a problem in the commercial sphere that the
federal government is better situated to address than the states. I
do not see how, from a federalism perspective, the distinction
between mandates and other forms of federal regulation—
between regulations of “inactivity” and “activity”—is relevant. It
has no basis in constitutional text, structure, history, precedent,
or a consequentialist analysis of the appropriate division of
74
powers in a federal system. It is a distinction sounding in
75
economic substantive due process.
Moreover, the distinction between inactivity and activity is
unresponsive to the very concerns about differences in
coerciveness that purport to justify it. There is no meaningful
difference in coerciveness between many kinds of mandates and
many other kinds of regulation. For example, there is little
difference in coerciveness between requiring individuals to
obtain health insurance coverage (regulation of “inactivity”) and
requiring them to obtain coverage if, but only if, they seek health
care services (regulation of “activity”), as almost everyone does
at some point. There is no meaningful difference in coerciveness
between requiring financially able individuals to purchase a
certain kind of food (regulation of “inactivity”) and requiring
individuals to purchase a certain kind of food if, but only if, they
decide to enter the food market by purchasing food (regulation
of “activity”), as almost everyone must.
Focusing just on health insurance coverage, there is no
difference in coerciveness between the minimum coverage
provision and a tax increase for everyone combined with a tax
credit for insured individuals that wipes out the increase and
equals the amount of the exaction for going without insurance in
the ACA. A requirement to obtain health insurance coverage or
74. See generally Siegel, supra note 4.
75. See, e.g., Leitch, supra note 31.
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pay $X is materially equivalent to a requirement that only
individuals with health insurance do not pay $X more in taxes.
Indeed, the exaction in the ACA for going without insurance is
76
materially equivalent to a tax.
By contrast, there is a meaningful difference in coerciveness
between the minimum coverage provision and a federal law
establishing a government-run, single-payer system of national
health care. But that is because the single-payer is more coercive
than the minimum coverage provision. The ACA preserves
private health insurance markets and allows individuals to
choose among a variety of private health insurance options. Also
more coercive than the minimum coverage provision is denying
people medical care unless they already have insurance—or
unless they agree to purchase it on the spot in the emergency
room.
And yet the Court may disagree. Notwithstanding the
arguments in support of the three limits set forth above, the
Court may be loath to commit to the proposition that Congress
may impose an economic mandate that respects individual rights
only if it reasonably concludes that the mandate meaningfully
addresses an interstate collective action problem. The Court may
conceive of the commerce power, at least in part, in libertarian
terms. And the Court may be sympathetic to the view that the
minimum coverage provision is coercive in a way that is
quantitatively or qualitatively different from other kinds of
federal regulation.
A Court so disposed is a Court that may be inclined to
break new doctrinal ground by announcing the constitutional
relevance of a distinction between regulating economic
“inactivity” and regulating economic “activity.” Such a Court,
however, should exhibit the same caution it exhibits in other
77
areas of constitutional law when it breaks new ground. Such a
Court should hesitate before holding broadly that Congress may
never impose an economic mandate no matter how grave the
interstate economic problem and no matter how much less
effective or more coercive other forms of federal regulation may
be.

76. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 36.
77. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (declining to impose a standard of review for the time being and limiting the holding to firearm possession in the home for purposes of self-defense).
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Instead, a Court concerned generally about the coerciveness
of rights-respecting economic mandates that solve interstate
collective action problems should remain faithful to a
constitutional understanding that has endured from McCulloch
78
79
v. Maryland to United States v. Comstock. According to this
understanding, Congress possesses ample means to pursue its
constitutionally enumerated ends. The most straightforward way
for a Court concerned about the potential coerciveness of
economic mandates nonetheless to vindicate this venerable
principle would be to compare the likely effectiveness and
coerciveness of the economic mandate under review with the
regulatory alternatives available to Congress. Specifically, such a
Court should ask whether the Congress that enacted the
economic mandate had a reasonable basis to conclude that other
80
regulatory means would be less effective or more coercive.
There often will be ways of addressing an interstate
economic problem whose effectiveness is roughly equivalent (or
superior) to imposing an individual mandate, particularly when
mandates are politically unpopular. To recall an earlier
suggestion, this observation about public perceptions of federal
regulation likely explains why Congress has not imposed
81
purchase mandates in the past using its commerce power. For
example, restricting a farmer’s wheat production seems
politically preferable to requiring him or her to purchase wheat
on the interstate market when the restriction on the supply side
82
sufficiently accomplishes the objectives of Congress.
Health care reform is a different kettle of fish. Based on the
experience of many states that have attempted to expand access
to health care, Congress reasonably concluded that the
regulatory alternatives to the minimum coverage provision
would be less effective or more coercive. It is well documented
that numerous insurers moved to other states when their home
state banned coverage denials based on preexisting conditions
but did not impose a coverage requirement. For example, almost
every insurer left the state when Kentucky passed reform
legislation; only one private insurer and one state-run insurer

78. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
79. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
80. This potential limit is built on the assumption that there is something distinctly
coercive about economic mandates. McCulloch would prohibit such a limit from being
imposed on all regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.
81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
82. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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remained. Insurers also left Washington, New York, and
86
several other states. By contrast, Congress accurately found
that Massachusetts has been substantially more successful in
87
preventing an exodus of insurers by imposing a mandate.
To be sure, Congress could have tried to combat the
88
adverse selection problem in other ways. For example, it could
have provided higher subsidies to tempt healthier individuals
89
into the insurance pool. Or Congress could have automatically
enrolled individuals in insurance as a default but allowed them
90
to opt out if they did not want coverage. Congress also could
have imposed limited open-enrollment periods and penalties for
91
92
late enrollment. Medicare uses some of these approaches.
But Congress can always elect to spend more money on a
problem, including by giving every American free health care.
83. See Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform
in Washington, Kentucky, and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 133 (2000).
84. Id.
85. Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 71 (2000).
86. Sara Rosenbaum & Jonathan Gruber, Buying Health Care, the Individual
Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 403 (2010) (“Five states have
tried to undertake reforms . . . without enacting an individual mandate; those five states
are now among the eight states with the most expensive nongroup health insurance.”);
Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 62, at 15–26 (surveying the
experience of Maine, New Jersey, Kentucky, New Hampshire Washington, New York,
Vermont, and Massachusetts in passing reform legislation without a mandate, and
finding a common trend of “destabilization of individual markets, increases in premiums,
and declines in enrollment”).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D) (West 2010) (“In Massachusetts, a similar
requirement has strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the economic
downturn, the number of workers offered employer-based coverage has actually
increased.”); see Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber, & Robin McKnight, The
Importance of the Individual Mandate—Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 293, 295 (2011) (offering evidence suggesting that the Massachusetts “mandate had
a causal role in improving risk selection”).
88. Congress also could have tried to address the cost shifting problem in another
way: it could have denied uninsured individuals access to stabilizing care in a medical
emergency. Congress, however, should not be faulted for rejecting a regulatory
alternative that it regards as immoral.
89. See, e.g., Chandra, Gruber, & McKnight, supra note 87 (analyzing the
approaches of mandates and subsidies and concluding that “the higher the subsidies, the
smaller the role for an individual mandate”).
90. See Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Without the Individual Mandate:
Replacing the Individual Mandate would Significantly Erode Coverage Gains and Raise
Premiums for Health Care Customers, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS at 3–5,
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/pdf/gruber_mandate.pdf.
91. See id. at 5–7.
92. Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient costs for individuals enrolled in
Medicare, combines auto-enrollment with a late enrollment penalty of 10 percent of
premiums for each year of delay. See id. at 5. Moreover, the Medicare Part D
prescription drug plan imposes a penalty for late enrollment. See id.
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So that consideration does not seem an appropriate part of the
analysis. Moreover, the context of health insurance is different
from Medicare, so it is uncertain whether the other alternative
methods noted above would be nearly as effective in achieving
93
high rates of enrollment as the minimum coverage provision.
Economist Jonathan Gruber of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, a defender of the minimum coverage provision in
the ACA, examined auto-enrollment and late enrollment
penalties, finding that “both alternatives significantly erode the
gains in public health and insurance affordability made possible
94
by the Affordable Care Act.”
Many constitutional critics of the ACA will no doubt
dismiss an inquiry into the effectiveness and coerciveness of
regulatory alternatives either as toothless in light of the
deference it shows Congress, or as lacking judicial
administrability, or as putting the federal courts in the
inappropriate position of second-guessing the policy judgments
of Congress. None of these criticisms suggests that the better
course is to invalidate the minimum coverage provision.
First, a reasonableness inquiry ought to suffice to satisfy
reasonable concerns about coerciveness. The test, properly
formulated, is whether Congress could have reasonably
concluded that substitutes for an economic mandate would be
less effective or more coercive. Ill-considered, gratuitously
coercive economic mandates will flunk this test. To ask more of
Congress is to impose Lochner-like strict scrutiny in Commerce
95
Clause cases, which is foreign to the Court’s federalism
96
jurisprudence. Under a restrained analysis of regulatory
alternatives, the Court could uphold the minimum coverage
provision while leaving itself principled room to invalidate future
economic mandates where it is evident that there were equally
effective, less coercive alternatives available to Congress.

93. See id. at 3–4 (discussing the differences between the two settings, including the
incentive of employers to encourage participation and the likelihood that young
employees have already considered participation).
94. Id. at 1. Specifically, Gruber found that “no alternative to the individual mandate can cover more than two-thirds as many uninsured as the Affordable Care Act
does;” that “no alternative to the mandate saves much money;” and that “any alternative
imposes much higher costs on those buying insurance in the new health insurance
exchanges as the healthiest opt out and the less healthy face increased premiums.” Id.
at 7.
95. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
96. See supra note 51 (quoting Judge Sutton).
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Second, the doctrinal test sketched above is no less
administrable than the balancing inquiries that courts apply in
97
other areas of constitutional law. Indeed, it likely is more
administrable than many such inquiries because of the measure
of deference built into the test. The courts would be tasked with
assessing the relative efficacy and coerciveness of different
regulatory alternatives at one step removed: they would ask
whether there is a reasonable basis for Congress’s judgment. If
such a test is not administrable, then neither is much of modern
constitutional law.
Third, concerns about putting the federal courts in the
position of second-guessing the policy judgments of Congress
counsel in favor of upholding an economic mandate without
inquiring about the regulatory alternatives. Such a concern does
not counsel in favor of invalidating all economic mandates in one
judicial decision regardless of the policy importance of imposing
any of them. It is far more respectful of Congress’s policy
expertise and political responsibility to impose a restrained
inquiry into regulatory alternatives than it is to declare all
98
economic mandates constitutionally out of bounds.
Critics and defenders of the ACA alike may nonetheless
agree that I am running a fool’s errand. On this view, a Court
that registers the policy justification for the minimum coverage
provision will uphold it without conducting an inquiry into
relative efficacy and coerciveness, and a Court that is
uninterested in the policy justification will balk at making the
kinds of judgments that such an inquiry entails. They may be
right. But then again they may be wrong, particularly given the
methodological disagreements among members of the Court. An
inquiry into relative efficacy and coerciveness is well suited to
jurists who are comfortable articulating standards and applying
balancing tests; who are inclined to decide momentous cases
relatively narrowly; and who want to construct doctrinal space in
97. Consider, for example, the analysis of less restrictive or less discriminatory
alternatives that is central to constitutional review of many free speech, equal protection,
and dormant commerce cases. Consider as well the balancing test required by Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in many procedural due process cases.
98. But cf. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We are loath to invalidate an act of Congress, and do
so only after extensive circumspection. But the role that the Court would take were we to
adopt the position of the government is far more troublesome. Were we to adopt the
‘limiting principles’ proffered by the government, courts would sit in judgment over
every economic mandate issued by Congress, determining whether the level of participation in the underlying market, the amount of cost-shifting, the unpredictability of need,
or the strength of the moral imperative were enough to justify the mandate.”).
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which to make constitutional distinctions among different kinds
99
of economic mandates.
VI. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF HEALTH CARE
With the four aforementioned constitutional limits on the
commerce power in mind, one is better situated to apprehend
the constitutional relevance of the five factors that economists
have identified as distinguishing the interstate health care
market from all or nearly all other markets. These factors
include: (1) the near certainty of use; (2) the unpredictability of
use; (3) the potentially ruinous cost of use; (4) the legal
restrictions on denying access to treatment in medical
emergencies; and, as a partial consequence of these four factors;
(5) the significant cost shifting and adverse selection problems
100
that cause market failure. In the interstate health care market,
101
these five conditions exist, in combination, to a great extent. In
present litigation in the federal courts, the federal government
has been emphasizing these characteristics with mixed success,
possibly because some reviewing courts misunderstand their
pertinence.
These five distinguishing characteristics of the interstate
health care market are not best thought of (only to be dismissed)
102
as freestanding criteria of constitutional judgment. Instead,
99. The Court may be reluctant to conduct an analysis of regulatory alternatives in
an enumerated powers case because such an inquiry would create tension with
McCulloch and would “feel” like part of a substantive due process analysis. Such
reluctance may suggest that the activity/inactivity distinction is better suited to a substantive due process claim than to a Commerce Clause objection to a federal law.
100. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Economics Scholars in Support of Appellant,
at *3, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058 (4th Cir. Mar. 7,
2011), 2011 WL 792209 (“[T]he health care market is characterized by five unique
factors—the unavoidable need for medical care; the unpredictability of such need; the
high cost of care; the inability of providers to refuse to provide care in emergency
situations; and the very significant cost-shifting that underlies the way medical care is
paid for in this country—which do not obtain in other markets.”).
101. See generally id.; cf. Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law:
An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 358 (2006) (considering “the
essential features of health care delivery that distinguish its legal issues from those of
other related fields,” and identifying as one of them “the high cost of care and wide
variability of need, which necessitate public or private insurance that fundamentally
alters medical economics”).
102. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235, 1295–96 (“These five factual
criteria comprising the government’s ‘uniqueness’ argument are not limiting principles
rooted in any constitutional understanding of the commerce power. Rather, they are ad
hoc factors that—fortuitously—happen to apply to the health insurance and health care
industries. They speak more to the complexity of the problem being regulated than the
regulated decision’s relation to interstate commerce. They are not limiting principles, but
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they are relevant to most of the present or potential
constitutional limits on the power of Congress to issue individual
mandates.
First, these factors speak to whether the minimum coverage
provision is economic in nature. In view of the inevitability of
consumption of health care services, the significant cost shifting
that occurs from the uninsured to other participants in the health
care market, and the substantial adverse selection problems that
undermine insurance markets, the subject matter addressed by
the minimum coverage provision is properly characterized as
economic. The provision is a key part of Congress’s effort to
regulate the health insurance and health care markets.
Second, these factors inform whether the minimum coverage provision addresses a significant problem of collective action
among the states. Not only do cost shifting and adverse selection
occur to a great (and extensively documented) extent, but their
effects also spill over state borders. With mobile participants in
the health insurance and health care markets, and with state
health care regimes of differing quality and generosity, states
end up imposing significant costs on one another without paying
for them.
Third, these five factors would be pertinent to a judicial
assessment of whether Congress reasonably concluded that
alternatives to a mandate would be less effective or more
coercive. Because everyone requires access to health care;
because no healthy person can know when she will require such
access; because the costs of such care can bankrupt even wealthy
Americans who lack insurance; because no one can lawfully be
denied emergency care; and because uninsured Americans shift
substantial costs to other participants in the health care market,
one is hard pressed to identify regulatory alternatives to the
minimum coverage provision that likely would prove about as
effective and less coercive. To my knowledge, no one has
identified such an alternative. Constitutional critics of the ACA
who stress the coerciveness of the minimum coverage provision
ought to be obliged to produce one.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s review of the constitutionality of the
minimum coverage provision in the Affordable Care Act will
limiting circumstances.”).
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likely turn on whether there are principled, judicially
enforceable limits on the scope of Congress’s enumerated
powers that the provision respects. No amount of properly
applying contemporary doctrine under the Commerce Clause,
the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the tax power may save
the minimum coverage provision unless the Court is persuaded
that a vote to uphold it is a vote to maintain judicially
enforceable limits on Congress’s powers.
I have identified several present or potential limits on the
scope of the Commerce Clause that the minimum coverage
provision honors. A principled jurist can conclude that the
provision is within the scope of the commerce power while also
embracing—or leaving for another day—some or all of the
following principles regarding Congress’s use of the Commerce
Clause:
(1) Congress may not regulate noneconomic subject
matter, whether the regulation is a mandate or not, and
whether the subject matter is deemed “inactivity” or
“activity.” For example, Congress may not ban or require
the possession of firearms in schools or in the home, nor
may Congress force people to render aid to stop the
commission of ordinary crimes like assault.
(2) Congress may not impose any regulation (including a
mandate) that violates constitutional rights. For example,
Congress may not force people to eat certain foods or
exercise a certain amount.
(3) In order to regulate at all, Congress must have a
reasonable basis to believe that the regulation will
ameliorate a significant problem of collective action
among the states. For example, all ordinary crime falls in
this category regardless of whether the victim of the crime
is a commercial enterprise.
(4) Congress may not impose an economic mandate
unless it has a reasonable basis to believe that the
regulatory alternatives would be less effective or more
coercive. For example, Congress may not require
individuals to purchase a product if Congress can
accomplish its regulatory objectives in a less coercive way,
such as by restricting production of the product or by
using tax incentives to encourage purchases.
In light of these present or potential limits, it would be difficult
for the Court convincingly to invalidate the minimum coverage
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provision on the ground that no judicially enforceable limits on
individual mandates are available.
To be sure, some of these limits will not be satisfactory to
those who believe that only categorical rules can meaningfully
103
104
limit federal power. But Gonzales v. Raich, in which Justices
Scalia and Kennedy voted with the majority to uphold federal
power without reasoning categorically, makes clear that such a
view of Congress’s enumerated powers is rejected by at least six
105
Justices (probably more), and for good reason. A vote to
uphold the minimum coverage provision is not a vote to
authorize Congress to impose whatever economic mandates it
wishes, let alone a vote to authorize Congress to impose
whatever mandates it wishes, let alone a vote to abandon judicial
enforcement of any constitutional limits on a national
government of enumerated powers.

103. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 16 (“Today, only a categorical principle will
preserve the protection of liberty afforded by the scheme of limited and enumerated
federal power: Congress may not use its ‘power to regulate commerce . . . among the
several states’ to conscript the American people to do business with private
companies.”). For a demonstration of why a distinction between inactivity and activity
would not be clear or categorical in practice, see generally Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, No. 10-2388, at 27 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and
delivering the opinion of the court in part).
104. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
105. See, e.g., supra note 71 (quoting the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens
in Raich, which Justice Kennedy joined); Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (“Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is
a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce. See Lopez, [514
U.S.] at 561. The relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are ‘reasonably
adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”).

